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ANNOUNCED TO TROUNCED: A JOURNALIST'S COMMENTS
ON THE DEMISE OF THE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
ADAM S. LEVY*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a journalist for Bloomberg News, I covered the tobacco settle-
ment, and saw it go from announced to trounced in just one year.
The settlement contained many beneficial provisions, and its demise
has already resulted in many negative consequences. The tobacco set-
tlement, in my opinion, was never passed by Congress largely because
the key players in the settlement placed their personal agendas ahead
of the need to compromise. In this article, I elaborate on these ideas,
provide some lesser-known history behind tobacco litigation and the
settlement, and offer an outlook for the future.'
* Adam S. Levy, B.A., Haverford College, 1984. Mr. Levy is a reporter for Bloomberg
News who covered the tobacco settlement. This article evolved from the author's presenta-
tion at the 1998 Ward, Kershaw and Minton Environmental Symposium; University of
Maryland School of Law; Baltimore, Maryland; April 24, 1998.
1. Parts of the article were adapted from CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS.
BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTFE GLANTs (1998) [hereinafter THE
PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO], a book co-authored by Levy, and Death of a Settlement: Bitter Defeat
for Tobacco Negotiators, Bloomberg News, June 18, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Bloomberg News File [hereinafter Bitter Defeat], a Bloomberg News article co-authored by
Levy.
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II. A TELLING STORY2
In the second week of June 1997, two small groups of attorneys
met late at night in a room at the Park Hyatt Hotel in Washington,
D.C. One of the groups was comprised of attorneys for some of the
largest manufacturers of cigarettes in the United States - Philip Mor-
ris Cos., the manufacturer of Marlboro brand cigarettes, and RJR
Nabisco Holdings Corp., the manufacturer of Camel brand cigarettes.
The other group was comprised of the private trial attorneys who had
filed class-action lawsuits against the tobacco industry on behalf of
their clients, thousands of addicted smokers.
After three months of very heated negotiations, these attorneys
- along with scores of attorneys general, tobacco industry lawyers,
leading public health advocates and White House officials - had ne-
gotiated all but the final details of what could have been the biggest
legal settlement in history.3 Hours earlier on that sweltering day,
under direct orders from White House Deputy Counsel Bruce Lind-
sey, the two sides had arrived at a $368.5 billion price tag to settle
most of the pending lawsuits against the tobacco industry giants ("Big
Tobacco") .'
After dinner, one of the anti-tobacco attorneys mentioned in
passing the $368.5 billion price of the settlement to the two lead attor-
neys representing the tobacco industry. At that moment, all of the
color washed out of the face of Meyer Koplow, the soft-spoken but
powerful New York City attorney from Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz,
who was representing Philip Morris, the biggest cigarette manufac-
turer in the world.5
Koplow said he had been told that the deal was for $386 billion,
not $368 billion. The anti-tobacco attorneys were flummoxed. One
reached for a cellular telephone and called Hugh Rodham, another
attorney representing smokers in class-action lawsuits. Rodham, inci-
dentally, also provided the anti-tobacco contingent with access to the
President of the United States of America - he's Bill Clinton's
brother-in-law.
Rodham immediately called Lindsey, who was at home getting
ready for bed. While in his bathrobe, Lindsey reviewed the numbers
2. Interviews with Anonymous Sources (Aug. - Sept., 1997).
3. 'See The Tobacco Resolution (visited Sept. 19, 1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.
corn>.
4. Id. at tit. VI.
5. See Steve Bailey & Steven Syre, $300 Billion Settlement Wouldn't Likely Choke Tobacco
Firms, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 1997, at D1 (stating Philip Morris made $69 billion in reve-
nue in 1996).
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with Rodham. The lower amount - $368.5 billion over the next
twenty-five years - was correct. The attorneys walked back into the
negotiating room and told the tobacco lawyers that $368.5 billion was
the true agreed upon amount. "We just saved you almost $20 billion,"
said one of them, rounding up the difference.
Twenty billion dollars - an oversight to these negotiators - is
the combined value of Apple Computer, Black and Decker Corp. and
the entire 5,100-store Wendy's restaurant chain - combined, and
times two.6 It's also about forty percent of the total dollar amount of
cigarettes sold in the United States in a single year.7 It would pay the
salaries of all the professional athletes in the National Basketball Asso-
ciation until the year 2018.8
There were many beneficial provisions in the settlement propo-
sal.9 Yet the fact that both sides would so sloppily handle $20 billion,
as if it were a low-value chip in a poker game, is telling. The high
stakes provided anti-tobacco negotiators with an incentive to back a
less-than-perfect settlement, in that they would have secured - for
future elections - the bragging rights of having scored the biggest
civil settlement in history. The story also shows how willing Big To-
bacco was to settle and how deep its pockets are as well as how badly it
needed a settlement: the industry would swallow an additional $20 bil-
lion, just for relief from this litigation.
III. TOBACCO LITIGATION HISTORY - AND AN INGENIOUS IDEA
Taking on Big Tobacco was, at best, improbable. In four decades
of tobacco litigation, no plaintiff collected damages from any of the
tobacco industry giants based on health problems resulting from to-
6. The combined market value of the three companies as ofJune 15, 1998, was $12.08
billion: Wendy's stock market capitalization was $3.18 billion, Black & Decker's was $5.19
billion and Apple Computer's was $3.71 billion. Search of Bloomberg Fin. Mkts. Commod-
ities News, Bloomberg News, Atlanta, Ga. (Aug. 17, 1998).
7. The 40% estimate is based upon estimated annual United States tobacco sales of
$50 billion, based on figures compiled by Tobacco Merchants Association. Telephone In-
terview with Tobacco Merchants Association (June, 1997).
8. Telephone Interview with Billy Hunter, Executive Director, National Basketball
Players Association (June, 1997).
9. For example, the settlement proposed to reduce underage smoking by penalizing
retailers through fines of up to $25,000 or the revocation of their license to sell tobacco
products for three years. See The Tobacco Resolution, (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://
www.tobaccoresolution.com/prd/AVI-58.html> app. II.2.f. It also allocated funds to gov-
ernment agencies to be used for enforcement of the settlement, including $300 million
annually to the Food and Drug Administration. See The Tobacco Resolution (visited Sept. 30,
1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.com/prd/PHF-36.html> tit. VII.A.24; see also notes
33-37 and accompanying text. For highlights of the Castano Smokers Common Benefits
Funds, see generally, J.D. LEE, THE SETrLEMENT app. B (1997).
1998]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & POLICY
bacco products.1" Big Tobacco was bullet proof. Liggett, a division of
Brooke Group Ltd., had lost a lawsuit in the early 1980s, Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc." The jury returned a $400,000 verdict to the hus-
band of a deceased smoker named Rose Cipollone for a claim of
breach of express warranty. 12 Yet after an appeals court reversed the
verdict and the Supreme Court remanded for a retrial, plaintiffs could
not afford to pursue the suit further.'" The industry retained its rec-
ord of never having paid a penny in damages.
On a May afternoon in 1993, however, an ingenious strategy was
hatched that would forever change the industry's invincibility. 14 It all
started with a little-known and deeply-personal story. Michael Lewis, a
small-town lawyer from Clarksdale, Mississippi, visited Jackie Thomp-
son, his friend and former secretary. 5 Thompson was in Baptist Cen-
tral Hospital, in Memphis, Tennessee, dying from complications tied
to smoking cigarettes. 6 As Lewis left the hospital, he thought about
the costs of treating people dying from tobacco-related cancer - the
long hospital stays, the teams of doctors and nurses trying to squeeze
out a few more days for patients, the expensive equipment pumping
life and feeling for vital signs, the last days at hospices.17 Lewis sup-
posed that these expenses were costing $1 million in his friend's case.
Lewis then formulated a plan to sue cigarette manufacturers for
the cost of treating sick smokers. Imagine combining the total costs
the state was spending treating sick smokers, he thought. What if
Lewis were to sue the cigarette makers on behalf of his home state,
Mississippi, to recoup the public money spent treating the indigent,
the aged and others who became sick from smoking? It was a simple
plan, but one that was brilliant and would ultimately prove to be very
effective.
10. See Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in
SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 127 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 1993). Big Tobacco's winning streak in courts extends back to 1954 when
the first case, Lowe v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9673(C) (E.D. Mo. filed Mar. 10, 1954),
was filed. See Rabin, supra, at 112. The case, which was later dropped, marks the begin-
ning of the "first wave" of tobacco litigation. See id. at n.6.
11. 693 F.Supp. 208 (D. N.J. 1988), affjd in part and rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.
1990), affd in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
12. See Cipollone, 693 F.Supp. at 210.
13. See RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR,
THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 639-77 (1996)
(describing the Cipollone suit).
14. See THE PEOPLE VS. Bic TOBACCO, supra note 1, at 23-30 (describing this story in
more detail).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id,
[VOL. 2:1
ANNOUNCED To TROUNCED
United States cigarette manufacturers had easily fended off de-
cades of lawsuits. The companies had argued, successfully, that smok-
ing is a personal choice, and that they should not be held accountable
for people's voluntary behavior and decisions. 18 They also argued
that there was no conclusive evidence that cigarettes actually caused
the illnesses that killed smokers. 9 Lewis decided to skirt this effective
defense by focusing not on individuals and the choices they made but
instead on the states - by pressing for reimbursement of the billions
of dollars the states spend to pay for the medical care of its sick smok-
ers.2° Lewis turned to two of his law school buddies from the Univer-
sity of Mississippi - Mississippi Attorney General Michael Moore and
plaintiffs' attorney Richard Scruggs.2 Scruggs had made millions of
dollars taking on asbestos manufacturers.22
A year later, armed with internal industry documents showing
that the manufacturers did in fact know of the dangers of smoking
and took steps to conceal them,2" Moore and Scruggs were ready to
file suit. On May 23, 1994 in Chancery Court in Jackson, Mississippi,
Moore filed Mississippi's landmark lawsuit against 13 tobacco compa-
nies.2 4 Over the next three years, 40 other states brought similar
suits. 25 These suits alone were not enough to drive the industry to the
negotiating table. A series of other events converged just at the right
time: leaks of confidential industry records, 26 defections by whistle-
18. See Tucker S. Player, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the
Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C.L. REv. 311, 312-19 (1998).
19. See id. at 316 (explaining the tobacco company lawyers' revamped attack on causa-
ion in the second wave of tobacco litigation).
20. See THE PEOPLE VS. BIG ToBAcco, supra note 1, at 25.
21. See id. at 27-29.
22. Scruggs successfully sued asbestos users, including Ingalls Naval Shipyard, in a se-
ries of health liability cases in 1992. See id. at 28.
23. See id. at 37-48 (explaining how Merrell Williams, a paralegal at a law firm for
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company, absconded with confidential documents inculpat-
ing Big Tobacco); see generally STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996).
Glantz anonymously received a box containing thousands of copies of Brown & William-
son documents detailing over thirty years of fraud and deceit by the tobacco industry. See
generally id. (explaining much of the contents of these documents, and many of their
strengths and weaknesses).
24. See THE PEOPLE VS. Bic ToBAcco, supra note 1, at 30.
25. See id. at 13. Other states that followed included Minnesota, Florida, California,
West Virginia, Arizona, Texas, and New York. Id. at 53, 171. South Carolina, which filed
suit in 1997, was the 40th state to sue and the first of the major tobacco-farming states to
sue. Georgia is the state which most recently filed suit.
26. One example of a confidential industry document is aJuly 1963 memo from Brown
& Williamson general counsel Addison Yeaman to a research conference in Britain. See id.
at 40; KLUGER, supra note 13, at 239. The memo discusses reports of a new cigarette filter,
and states in part, "Moreover, nicotine is addictive. We are in the business, then, of selling
nicotine, an addictive drug." Id.
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blowers,27 an increasingly activist Food and Drug Administration
(FDA)2" and the re-election of Clinton, an anti-tobacco President ea-
ger to forge a lasting public-health legacy.
29
IV. BENEFICIAL PROVISIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT
There were several beneficial provisions in the settlement. Big
Tobacco agreed to pay $368.5 billion."0 Consider that this price tag
equals approximately the combined annual gross national product of
Greece, Ireland, Chile, New Zealand, and Kenya."' If the companies
were paying in mid-sized family sedans, the line of cars would stretch
from Los Angeles to Cleveland.32 The settlement would have re-
quired cigarette companies to pay, if the settlement's measures failed
to reduce teen smoking by thirty percent in five years and sixty per-
cent in a decade, an annual penalty of as much as $2 billion.33 The
Senate bill, sponsored by John McCain of Arizona,34 would have
raised $516 billion over twenty five years by taxing cigarettes and using
some of the proceeds to finance tax breaks and drug-abuse
programs.
The settlement, however, was more than dollars and cents. It
would have imposed strict limits on marketing upon the United States
tobacco industry, requiring it to advertise cigarettes less seductively
and package them more truthfully.36 Arguably the most important
aspect of the settlement, though, was its provision allowing the Food
27. Former Brown & Williamson research chief Jeffrey Wigand cooperated with the
United States Food and Drug Administration investigation into big tobacco. See id. at 111-
14. He helped the Administration obtain thousands of pages of documents showing the
tobacco companies' efforts to strengthen cigarettes and to make them more addictive. See
id. at 113.
28. FDA Commissioner David Kessler waged a three-year war against Big Tobacco from
1994 to 1997. See id. at 107-21.
29. See id. at 114-15 (describing President Clinton making tobacco an issue in his 1996
re-election campaign by blaming corporate greed, the industry's youth-targeted advertis-
ing, and the industry's relentless congressional lobbying).
30. See The Tobacco Resolution (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.
com/prd/A-34.html> tit. VI.
31. See THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO, supra note 1, at 32. These countries' gross na-
tional products may be found at World Factbook (visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http://www.
odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.
32. See THE PEOPLE vs. BIG TOBACCO, supra note 1, at 32.
33. See Robert Langreth, The Settlement: Accord Is No Match For Power of Nicotine, WALL ST.
J., June 23, 1997, at B10.
34. S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1998).
35. See Death of a Settlement, supra note 1.
36. The settlement would have required cigarette packages to state, for example, that
cigarettes are addictive and can cause cancer. See The Tobacco Resolution (visited Sept. 30,
1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.com/prd/A-l.html> tit. I.B.
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and Drug Administration to regulate the toxic content of cigarettes,3 7
America's most harmful consumer product. The settlement could
have been notjust a legal deal, but a paradigm for how to resolve vital
public policy issues.
V. No HEROES IN THE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
Although the settlement contained beneficial provisions, its tale
is not one of some lawyers from Mississippi using grass roots efforts to
slay a dragon. Make no mistake about it - there are no heroes in the
saga of the tobacco settlement.
Michael Moore, the de facto leader of the state attorneys general,
may be the protagonist, but he is not a hero. Moore prodded dozens
of states to file lawsuits against Big Tobacco38 and fought valiantly for
the disclosure of internal tobacco industry documents.39 As Moore's
critics charge, however, he probably pushed for too lenient a settle-
ment in an effort to raise his political profile."° He agreed to some
major industry demands, as the final settlement included a ban on
individual class-action lawsuits" and an enormous loop-hole that
would have made it simple for the tobacco industry to escape the reg-
ulatory control of the FDA."2 Moore has hinted that he may run for
Governor of Mississippi in 1999."
The private attorneys involved in the settlement stood to gain.
Scruggs has said he invested millions in the fight against Big Tobacco.
Other attorneys did so as well, and they were not guaranteed to re-
ceive anything in return. While this was a big risk, these private plain-
tiffs attorneys stand to make a phenomenal (some argue obscene)
amount of money. For example, Florida's settlement was for $11 bil-
lion, and six of the twelve private law firms that played a part in nego-
tiating the settlement argued that they should receive a contingency
fee of $2.5 billion over twenty five years - as much as $280 million
37. See The Tobacco Resolution (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://www.tobaccoresolution.
com/prd/A-39.htmi> tit. I.E.
38. See THE PEOPLE VS. Bic TOBACCO, supra note 1, at 52-53.
39. See id. at 46.
40. Moore's critics were concerned that he was tailoring the settlement toward congres-
sional approval. See id. at 76.
41. See The Tobacco Resolution (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://vww.tobaccoresolution.
com> tit. VIII.A.1.
42. See Lauran Neergaard, Tobacco Foes Find Flaws in Fine Print, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.),June 23, 1997, at Al; Henry Weinstein, The Longer They Talk, The Less They Agree, THE
SEATrLE TIMES, June 9, 1997, at A2.
43. See THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO, supra note 1, at 98. For an article discussing
Moore's mistakes in his efforts for the settlement, and his political interest and ambition,
see Death of a Settlement, supra note 1.
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per firm. 4 Some analysts have calculated that with such a return, the
attorneys would make about $100,000 an hour from the tobacco
settlement.
45
The tobacco company executives also stood to gain. The Chief
Executive Officers of Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco, Geoffrey Bible
and Steve Goldstone,4 6 steered the tobacco companies into settlement
negotiations.4 7 They were bold and shattered the mold of Big To-
bacco chieftains who for decades were a bunch of southern tobacco
barons who defied public opinion, disputed medical evidence, and
lied or dissembled information. 4' But Bible and Goldstone aren't he-
roes. The companies - which manufacture and distribute the most
dangerous consumer product in the land - were motivated to strike a
deal to protect themselves,4 9 boost stock prices,5" and, not inciden-
tally, boost the CEOs' stock options.
On the political side, recall Al Gore's tearful lament at the Demo-
crat National Convention when he mourned the death of his sister
who started smoking at age 13.5" Gore neglected to share with the
conventioneers that until 1988, the Gore family farmed tobacco. 52 It
was the family's most lucrative crop.55 President Clinton, who may
have had good intentions of helping curb teen smoking, surely sees
the tobacco settlement as part of his legacy. 4 Clinton doesn't have
many good public policy issues to take with him to the history books,
so this entire crusade can be seen more as a personal issue than a
public health concern.
Even the seemingly heroic figures are far from virtuous. Con-
sider, for example, Merrell Williams. Williams was a theater major at
44. See Joyce Howard Price, Lauryers, States Tussle Over Tobacco-Suit Fees, WASH. TIMES,
June 7, 1998, at Al.
45. E.g., Interview with Lester Brickman, Professor, Benjamin Cardozo Law School; see
also Price, supra note 44 (stating Brickman saying that the lawyers in the Texas settlement
would receive $2.3 billion for the settlement, equal to $92,000 an hour). The Florida law-
yers, he said, would receive $15,000 to $25,000 an hour. See id.
46. See THE PEOPLE VS. Bic TOBACCO, supra note 1, at 6.
47. See id. at 14.
48. See id. at 11.
49. If the industry had continued with the litigation, it would have run the risk of pay-
ing hundreds of millions of dollars in legal fees and paying for jury verdicts against it. See
id. at 54-55.
50. Stock prices of the tobacco companies fell as the cases against the industry gained
momentum. See id. at 55.
51. See id. at 235.
52. See id. at 236.
53. See id.
54. Clinton considered the tobacco settlement a key part of his legacy especially con-
sidering the failure of his health care reform proposal. See id. at 244.
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Baylor University in Texas when he became hooked on smoking Kool
cigarettes.5 5 Later, after a failed marriage and two failed careers, Wil-
liams got a nine dollar an hourjob as a paralegal at a law firm sorting
through confidential documents of the tobacco company Brown &
Williamson. 56 He was sickened by what he read, as document after
document showed the lengths to which tobacco company executives
had gone to cover-up the risks of smoking.
57
Although Williams was supposed to sort and guard the company's
secrets, he instead stole more than 4,000 pages of documents -
smuggling many of them out by taping them to his body.58 He eventu-
ally gave the documents to the Mississippi attorneys, Moore and
Scruggs, who were suing the tobacco industry.59 These documents
proved to be crucial evidence which bolstered the states' fight.6" But
nothing is black and white. Before Williams turned over his docu-
ments to Mike Moore and his partners, he tried selling them back to
the tobacco industry - for $2.5 million.61 Williams, a thief for steal-
ing the documents, didn't have an attack of conscience which made
him steal the documents. He was looking to make some quick dollars
- 2.5 million of them. As these examples illustrate, personal agendas
were pervasive among the players in the settlement.
VI. POLITICS SNUFFED OUT THE SETTLEMENT
Personal agendas played an especially crucial role when Congress
considered the settlement. The force that snuffed out the settlement
can be summed up in one word - politics. The original accord
never had a champion in Congress.6 2 Rather than championing the
settlement, lawmakers cluttered the year-long debate with issues such
as whether married couples should get a break on their income
taxes.63 President Clinton claimed he wanted to cut teen smoking,
but he never provided the strong support the settlement needed to
55. See id. at 38-40.
56. See id. at 37-39.
57. See id. at 40; see also supra note 26.
58. See THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO, supra note 1, at 41. For a book about the contents
of the documents and an analysis of them, see generally GLANTz, supra note 23.
59. See THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO, supra note 1, at 46.
60. Scruggs saw the documents as showing that the tobacco company representatives
had repeatedly lied under oath. See id. at 47. The documents could help show that smok-
ing was not a mere personal choice, and that the industry could have revealed information
that would have saved lives. See id
61. See id. at 41.
62. See Death of a Settlement, supra note 1.
63. See id.
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get through Congress, said several negotiators involved in writing the
accord.64
Senate Republicans, led by Majority Leader Trent Lott, criticized
the McCain bill as a big-government, tax-and-spend plan, and ulti-
mately mustered enough votes to defeat it. 5 Some public-health ad-
vocates immediately denounced the bill as being too soft on Big
Tobacco.66 "This settlement grants legitimacy and vindication to the
industry - issuing to it a 'get out of jail free' card for too low of a
price," John Garrison, chief executive of the American Lung Associa-
tion, said just a few days after the accord was announced.6"
In the process of attacking the bill, the parties diluted it. The
legislation that the Senate ultimately rejected bore only a passing re-
semblance to the original settlement proposal.68 The McCain bill
didn't include the proposed settlement's $25 billion for smoking-pre-
vention programs. 6" It also didn't have the protections from legal lia-
bility won by Philip Morris, RJR, and other cigarette makers last year.7 0
Clinton said, "If more members of the Senate would vote like par-
ents rather than politicians, we could solve this problem."'" Michael
Moore blames both Democratic and Republican lawmakers. "The
states, through our lawsuits and settlement, brought this opportunity
to Congress to enact a national tobacco policy that would reduce
under-aged smoking and lead to greater control of the tobacco indus-
try," he said.72 "It's unbelievable that Congress doesn't want to seize
that opportunity."7 " For public-health activist Bill Novelli, the $368.5
billion tobacco settlement was dead long before the Senate killed anti-
smoking legislation in mid-June, two days shy of the one-year anniver-
sary of the announcement of the settlement proposal.7 4 "How did we
start with a historic step forward and end up with nothing?" wonders
64. See id. "[Clinton] planted late and he didn't use enough fertilizer, and now he
can't complain about the kind of crop he's got," Richard Scruggs, who represents 27 of the
41 states that sued the industry and a key architect of the original agreement, said a week
before the Senate killed the settlement. See id. Scruggs is the brother-in-law of Senate
Republican Majority Leader Trent Lott, and stands to make millions of dollars in legal fees
from the states he represents in cases still pending. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Audio tape of News Conference, held by Bloomberg News (June 17, 1998) (on file
with author).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
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Novelli, president of the National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids, a
non-profit agency in Washington. 75 The upshot of Congressional in-
action, he fears, will mean even more teenagers hooked on ciga-
rettes. 76 As these examples illustrate, political agendas had the parties
doing too much fighting and too little compromising.
VII. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SETTLEMENT'S DEMISE
The demise of the tobacco settlement is an opportunity lost. Em-
bittered public health advocates are left wondering what might have
been. "We'd have wasted an incredible opportunity and effort," said
Matt Myers, executive vice president and general counsel for the Na-
tional Center for Tobacco-Free Kids, who helped negotiate last year's
accord. 7 7 Novelli says activists could have had a portion of a $25 bil-
lion trust fund to mount a serious campaign to curb youth smoking.
78
Instead, teen tobacco use is soaring.79 Smoking jumped by almost
fifty percent among eighth and tenth graders between 1991 and
1996.80 "If we had those resources, we'd be able to do a far better
job," Novelli said.8" "A year has passed and the trend is going the
wrong way," he added.8 2
The demise of the tobacco settlement has also taken a toll on
tobacco stock investors. Once the darlings of Wall Street, tobacco
companies were renowned for delivering steady earnings gains,
double-digit returns, fat dividends and regular share buybacks. But
investors have seen the promise that the industry would receive a
shield from future lawsuits, protection from crippling judgments, shat-
tered. From June 1997 to June 1998, a year in which the settlement
was announced and then trounced, shares of the two dominant
United States cigarette markers, Philip Morris and RJR, dropped on
average more than twenty percent, while the stock market gained
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id; Statement by Center for Tobacco-Free Kids on FDA Regulations, U.S. Newswire, Feb.
28, 1997, available in WESTLAW, USNWSW Database (citing the results of a study called
Monitoring the Future, an annual, national survey of American secondary school students,
University of Michigan, December 1996); see also Patrick M. O'Mally et al., Adolescent Sub-
stance Abuse: Epidemiology and Implications for Public Policy, 42 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF N. Am.
241 (1995) (discussing tobacco use among eighth to twelfth graders).
81. See Death of a Settlement, supra note 1.
82. See id.
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twenty percent.8" "The most important provision for tobacco inves-
tors - the liability protection -just vanished," said Martin Feldman,
a tobacco analyst at Salomon Smith Barney.84 "In essence, all the
promises were erased," he said.85
So now, we're left with almost nothing. There will be no advertis-
ing restrictions, so the Marlboro Man and Joe Camel won't be ban-
ished as many attorneys general had promised. There will be no
guaranteed multi-billion dollar payments to states. The FDA may con-
tinue to be unable to regulate tobacco products, particularly in light
of a recent federal appeals court decision.86 All we end up with, in
essence, is a docket full of lawsuits. The blue haze of litigation hang-
ing over the United States tobacco industry isn't likely to clear any
time soon. Big Tobacco likely will have to begin defending itself
against numerous state lawsuits scheduled to go to trial in the next
twelve months.87 Since Congress failed to come to the rescue, the
companies also will have to contend with at least twenty-five class-ac-
tion suits, to date, brought by smokers and their families.88
The tobacco industry has already settled out of court with some
states. It agreed to pay $36 billion over 25 years to the first four states
that sued - Mississippi, Florida, Texas and Minnesota.89 That's just
83. See id. The Standard & Poor's index of 500 stocks gained 22.4% from June 20, 1997
to June 19, 1998 (898.70 to 1100.65). Search of Bloomberg Fin. Mkts. Commodities News,
Bloomberg News, Atlanta, Ga. (on file with author). Shares of Philip Morris, over the same
period, fell 19.4% from 48 to 38 11/16, and shares of RJR declined 32.9% from 36 1/2 to 24
1/2. Id.
84. See Death of a Settlement, supra note 1.
85. See id.
86. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., Nos. 97-1604, 97-
1581, 97-1606, 97-1614, 97-1605, 1998 WL 473320, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 1998). The
FDA, on August 28, 1996, published a rule setting out regulations concerning the sale and
distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to minors, and limiting the advertising
and promotion of tobacco products. See id. In a 2-1 decision, a Fourth Circuit panel held
that the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, and thus invalidated all of
the August 28, 1996 regulations. See id The panel opined that "Congress did not intend to
delegate jurisdiction over tobacco products to the FDA." Id. at *19. The decision is cur-
rently stayed, however, until the court rules on the government's rehearing request.
87. States that have already sued the tobacco industry include Iowa, Minnesota, Flor-
ida, Washington, and Maryland. See State of Iowa v. Philip Morris Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401
(1998); State of Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc., 1998 WL 257214 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1988);
State of Florida v. American Tobacco Co., 707 So.2d 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); State of
Washington v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 1997 WIL 714842 (Wash. Super. 1997); State of
Maryland v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1997 WL 540913 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1997).
88. See, e.g., Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. et al., 1998 VWL 398176 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.
1998); Geiger v. American Tobacco Co. et al., 674 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1998).
89. See BAT Insurance/Tobacco Reports First-Half Profits 14 Percent Lower, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, July 29, 1998; US Attorneys General Reach Agreement on Tobacco Strategy, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, July 15, 1998; US Tobacco Firms in Secret Talks to Settle 37 State Lawsuits,
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the beginning of the state lawsuits. The state of Washington's open-
ing arguments began September 28.90 More states have court dates in
the next 12 months - Oklahoma, Massachusetts, Arizona, California,
Maryland, New Jersey, and New York.91
In addition, to date, there are some 800 lawsuits from individual
smokers9 2 and, on a new front, United States tobacco companies are
facing lawsuits from other countries. In May, 1998, Guatemala filed
suit in United States District Court in Washington, D.C., against
Brown & Williamson, Liggett and Philip Morris, in the first such ac-
tion brought by a foreign government.93 Attorneys in Israel, Ireland,
and Australia are known to be considering lawsuits against the
industry.94
VIII. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
In the absence of the settlement, public health groups, tobacco
stock investors, state attorneys general and individual smokers are
completely dependent on the whims of jurors and appellate boards.
Even if the anti-tobacco litigants start winning in court, Philip Morris
and RJR could rip a page out of the history books and do what Dow
Corning did in the wake of all the breast-implant litigation - file for
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,JUIy 10, 1998; Samuel Goldreich, Tobacco Industry Settles Rather Than
Fight, THE WASH. TIMES, May 9, 1998, at Al.
90. See Matthew Ebnet, Tobacco Industry Lied to America, State Says in Opening Statements,
SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998, at BI; John Bacon, Tobacco Trial Begins Today in Washington
State, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 1998, at 3A.
91. Court dates are as follows: Oklahoma -Jan. 25, 1999; Massachusetts - Feb. 1, 1999;
California - Mar. 1, 1999; Oregon - Apr. 5, 1999; Maryland - Apr. 5, 1999; New Jersey - May
1, 1999; New York - May 17, 1999.
92. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Widdick, 1998 WL 476268 (Fla.
App. 1 Dist. 1998) (opinion subject to revision or withdrawal); Appavoo v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 1998 WL 440036 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) Geiger v. American Tobacco Co., 674 N.Y.S.2d
775 (1998); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 1998 WL 323484 (Fla. App.1
Dist. 1998); RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cantley, 1998 WL 290288 (Ala. 1998); Bucking-
ham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 713 A.2d 381 (N.H. 1998); Pitre v. GAF Corp., 705 So.2d
1149 (La. Ct. App. 1997); DaSilva v. American Tobacco Co., 667 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1997).
93. Mark Suzman, Guatemala Files Lawsuit on Tobacco, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 1998, at 6.
94. See N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 1998, at 29; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 29, 1998, at 3;
Josh Karlen & Bob Van Voris, WEB Fuels Suits Against Tobacco Worldwide, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 30,
1998, at A7.
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bankruptcy. 5 Bankruptcy would put a halt to lawsuits and to most of
the payments Congress now hopes to get from the industry. 6
There is still some chance that the tobacco legislation killed by
the Senate may yet rise again in a different form. Clinton vowed to
press ahead in the aftermath of the bill's demise and said he would
continue to fight for legislation to cut teen smoking.97 "This battle is
far from over," Clinton said.9" But even if the President was to take an
active role in crafting a new agreement, Congress did not pass any
legislation this year, especially considering the 1998 Congressional
elections in November. 9
IX. CONCLUSION
Having Big Tobacco pay a large sum on account of its actions and
submit to regulation could improve the public health of the nation.
And the industry may deserve to be reviled for denying the dangers of
smoking while it full well knew that cigarettes were deadly and addic-
tive. Yet the anti-tobacco lobby should have realized that regulating
tobacco, not punishing the industry, was its primary goal. The only
way to reach an accommodation is for the different sides - the to-
bacco companies, the states, the private plaintiff attorneys, and the
others - to work together. If the parties would compromise their
personal agendas, more than they did as the settlement was trounced,
we could reach an accommodation with Big Tobacco.
95. See Jay Mathews, Breast Implant Maker Files for Bankruptcy: Dow Corning Tactic Threatens
Settlement, WAsii. POST, May 16, 1995, at Al. Filing for bankruptcy shielded Dow Corning
from creditors while it ordered its financial affairs. See id. Dow Corning, faced with law-
suits from harmful silicone breast implants, said that bankruptcy was the only way for it to
avoid being overwhelmed by soaring legal costs. See id.
96. Cf id.
97. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
98. Id.
99. See Death of a Settlement, supra note 1.
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